



Frictional Encounters in Postwar Human Rights: An Analysis of LGBTQI Movement Activism 
in Lebanon 
 
The advancement of LGBTQI rights is now a significant component of many international aid 
programmes. The successful diffusion of LGBTQI rights is supposed to rest on a successful 
interaction between international agencies that foster global rights and social movement actors that 
embed these processes at the local level. Yet, these encounters between global human rights ideas and 
local practices may not always generate positive dynamics. Drawing on the concept of ‘friction’ – the 
unstable qualities of interaction between global and local forces – this paper explores the relationship 
between international actors promoting LGBTQI rights and local social movement activists in post-
conflict societies. I argue that the notion of global rights is particularly problematic in the context of 
post-conflict societies where rights are allocated on the basis of sectarian identity. To empirically 
illustrate these issues, I look at LGBTQI social movement activism in the divided society of Lebanon. 
In particular, I examine the emergence and development of Helem - the first recognised LGBTQI 
rights group in the Middle East and North Africa – which quickly became the poster child for 



















In a number of states around the world sexual minorities, notes the United Nations, 
experience ‘killings, rape and physical attacks, torture, arbitrary detention, the denial of rights 
to assembly, expression and information, and discrimination in employment, health and 
education’.1 In October 2015, the UN in a statement called on states to act urgently to end 
violence and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, Queer/Questioning 
and Intersex (LGBTQI) adults, adolescents and children. The UN declared that ‘Human 
rights are universal – cultural, religious and moral practices and beliefs and social attitudes 
cannot be invoked to justify human rights violations against any group, including LGBTI 
[Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Intersex] persons’.2 Running parallel to these demands, 
the promotion of LGBTQI rights has increasingly become a significant component of 
international development programmes. Leading aid agencies incorporate LGBTQI rights 
into their institutional mission and underwrite core policies supporting rights diffusion and 
sexual equality in places where sexual minorities experience oppression and violence. 
LGBTQI movements and activists in developing countries are identified by agencies for 
funding so that they can oppose homophobia and provide support services for a vulnerable 
sexual minority population. In consequence, while sexual minorities were once marginalised 
in development programmes, the recent attention to and funding for LGBTQI within 
international development programming represents a ‘Queering’ of human rights.3 
 The efficacy of approaches to the diffusion of LGBTQI rights therefore rests on a 
productive interaction between the global and the local, between international development 
agencies and human rights groups that foster global norms, on the one hand, and social 
movement actors that receive and embed these processes at the local level on the other. 
Global processes, as Tsing reminds us, can only be charged and enacted though practical 
encounters at the local level.4 For Merry, human rights social movement activists working at 
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the local scale ‘vernacularise’ – translate the ‘transnational metacode of human rights to local 
situations’ – so as to achieve policy and attitudinal change.5  Thus, for example, the repeal of 
Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Act has been identified as the outcome of the ‘close working 
relationship between international actors and national civil society’. 6 
 Yet, these encounters between global and local actors, human rights ideas and 
practices may not always generate predetermined, predictable and positive dynamics. 
Scholars increasingly illuminate the uneven, unequal, unexpected and uncertain processes 
and outcomes that occur as a product of global and local interactions in human rights. These 
meetings and collisions ‘can be both a site for empowerment and for domination’ for local 
activists and populations.7 A variety of conceptual frameworks are deployed to capture these 
complex forces. Merry notes that social movement activists may either ‘replicate’, ‘hybridise’ 
or ‘subvert’ global human rights norms.8 Tsing, similarly, has coined the concept of 
‘friction’: the ‘awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities’ of global interaction’.9 
Applying friction to the consequences of international peacebuilding programmes, Björkdahl 
and Höglund note a range of responses by local actors ‘which arise as a result of meetings 
between actors, ideas and practice in global – local relationships’, and include ‘compliance, 
adoption, adaptation, co-option, resistance and rejection’.10 
 Research on frictionality tends to view such engagements as leading to a singular 
form of movement response. That is, local human rights movements may either decide on 
compliance, adoption, adaptation, co-option, resistance and rejection in relation to global 
rights. Yet, the full array of these strategic options may uneasily coincide within the same 
movement. Activists can contentiously divide as whether to align the movement to the global 
human rights framework or pursue instead a more radical form of opposition to what they 
perceive as limiting rights-based discourse that does not resonate with the local environment 
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the movement operates within. Global rights norms and discourses can generate 
intramovement acrimony and splits. 
 In this paper I explore how this multiple form of frictionality can be the result of 
LGBTQI rights activism in societies that are have experienced sectarianised civil war and 
political violence. In such societies, postwar political and public institutions aim to 
accommodate the identities of the respective ethnic or ethnoreligious groups.11 These 
sectarian systems are characterised by path dependent features that resist any attempt by non-
sectarian groups aiming to achieve policy reform.12 Non-sectarian movements, such as 
LGBTQI movements, confront deeply entrenched structural and agential barriers that stymie 
their capacity to realise objectives13.  In addition, the weak state and dysfunctional structure 
of postwar sectarian systems affords little opportunities for movements advancing rights and 
policy change, especially as informal rather than formal institutions predominate and 
sectarian interests are almost exclusively accommodated within these structures.  
 In the context of such structures which provide limited room for movements to 
manoeuvre, activists confront a number of tactical and strategic dilemmas regarding how to 
achieve rights and socio-political change. In other words, since the formal sectarian 
institutions of the state are closed to the LGBTQI movement, movement members debate and 
diverge on whether to ‘upscale’ or ‘downscale’ their activism. ‘Upscale’ refers to the process 
through which movements seek to go above state institutions by engaging with powerful 
international actors who activists hope will use their leverage to effect rights. ‘Downscale’, 
alternatively, denotes how activists circumvent formal institutions by instead working within 
informal institutions and channels at the local level. This scale also involves activists seeking 
to confront and render inoperable homophobic institutions and practices. This ‘downscaling’ 
can also include radical expressions activism that purposely seeks to confront and eradicate 
sectarian institutions that are identified as reproducing homophobia and patriarchy. 
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 In addressing these issues, I look at LGBTQI social movement activism in postwar 
Lebanon. In particular I examine the emergence and development of Helem – the first 
recognised LGBTQI rights group in the Middle East and North Africa – which quickly 
became the poster child for international development and aid agencies from the Global 
North.14 I focus on the frictional outcomes that occur within Lebanon’s LGBTQI movements 
as activists generate differing methods and tactics for pursuing rights.  
 While it is important to record the immense challenges for non-sectarian movements 
in Lebanon, in this paper I also trace the complex, multiple and important ways in which the 
Lebanese LGBTQI movement create changes. I argue that it is necessary to broaden our 
understanding of social movement impacts in Lebanon from the policy domain to also 
include the process through which movements render sectarian power inoperative and their 
capacity to foment wider attitudinal transformation which contradict sectarian hegemony. 
This process of capturing social movement impacts requires us to also uncover the backstage, 
unofficial work of movements whose activism functions through securing relatively 
unofficial, de jure rather than de facto forms of rights from key agencies and actors which 
risk being conditional and easily revocable. In particular, given the weak and dysfunctional 
state structure that characterises the sectarian system, I argue that non-sectarian movements 
effect change by operating within informal institutions or where the state is not always 
strongly present. 
 The research for this paper comprises five fieldwork phases in Lebanon (September 
2012, July 2014, June 2015, January 2016, October 2017). A constructivist epistemology was 
utilised for interviewing Lebanese LGBTQI activists (N-30) and an interpretative framework 
for analysing them. In the constructivist epistemology, the object of qualitative research is to 
understand that knowledge is gained through the social constructions of the individuals we 
research. The interpretative framework does not outline testable hypotheses, but instead 
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focuses on understanding the social context in which humans make sense of their subjective 
reality and attach meaning to it as the situation develops. Given that LGBTQI activists 
continue to experience various forms of state harassment and persecution, all respondents 
remain anonymous in this paper. 
 
Developing LGBTQI Rights in Postwar Societies 
While scholars and policymakers recognise the profoundly gendered impacts of 
contemporary civil war and peace processes, these effects are rarely considered in relation to 
LGBTQI populations. Yet sexual minorities are specifically targeted during conflict. The 
harrowing plight of Syria’s LGBTQI members in the civil war is well documented by human 
rights groups.15 ‘Corrective violence’ or social cleansing featured as a strategy against sexual 
minorities Colombia deemed as failing to conform to traditional gender stereotypes.16 Anti-
LGBTQI violence is common to societies emerging from conflict, including in Uganda, 
Northern Ireland, South Africa, Bosnia, and Lebanon. From the use of corrective rape against 
lesbians in post-apartheid South Africa to the targeting of gay and lesbian people in post-
Agreement Northern Ireland, attacks against LGBTQI people are pervasive in peace process 
societies.17 LGBTQI individuals and communities are often targeted in fragile postwar 
societies in which violence between the formerly warring communities is no longer 
acceptable and, as such, can easily become submerged in more politically allowable forms of 
discrimination. 
 In order to understand the status of Lebanon’s LGBTQI population it is necessary to 
detail the character of the state’s postwar sectarian institutional structures. Lebanon’s civil 
war, which began in 1975 and ended in 1990, is often simplistically framed as ethnoreligious 
– between Christian and Muslim sects – it was extremely complex and involved a succession 
of conflicts involving multiple internal and external actors and states.18  However, the war 
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had a hardening effect on sectarian identities, a process that was exacerbated by ‘mass 
displacement, wide-scale killing, rape, torture, arbitrary detention, and enforced 
disappearances’.19 The warlords sought to destroy ‘all memories of coexistence and common 
interests between the Lebanese’.20 
 The war expedited rounds of ethnic cleansing and it produced new powerful sectarian 
political networks. In the absence of a functioning state, the warlords nurtured forms of 
governance that covered their sectarian fiefdoms. The sectarian militias constructed their own 
spheres of civil society to distribute a wide portfolio of services for the communities they 
claimed to defend. Practically everything – ranging from medical care, schooling and 
universities, refuse and postal collection, the supply of gas and electricity, and even childcare 
– became subject to the purview of the sectarian militias. By providing basic services, the 
militias exploited the situation to extend jurisdictional and coercive control over their war 
weary communities. 
 The civil war officially ended with the Ta’if Peace Agreement in 1989. In essence, the 
Agreement formalised the sectarian structures established during the war. Ta’if’s title – ‘no 
victor and no vanquished’ – signified that peace is achieved by creating an institutional 
apparatus that ensured no group could dominate the state.21 The key institutional mechanism 
to freeze the balance of power between the main groups was power-sharing. In this system, 
all of the salient sectarian groups are guaranteed representative power in government and 
across the public sector based on their presumed demographic size. Post-war Lebanese 
elections have led to ‘hardening, rather than ameliorating, sectarian cleavages’.22As Cammett 
puts it: ‘The allocation of government posts by sect combined with the electoral system 
constitute and perpetuate sectarianism as the foundation of politics’.23 
 The process of maintaining the balance of power between groups percolates into all 
aspects of state and society relations. The principle of the allotment state (‘muhassa al-
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dawla’) means that the respective sectarian elites – often former warlords – are granted 
control of major public offices, which they utilise as both instruments for personal 
enrichment and as a resource for clientelism within their own sectarian networks.24 At the 
same time, endemic state weaknesses are deliberately maintained by sectarian elites so that 
goods and services are placed under their administrative networks. These social welfare 
services – especially healthcare and education – are used to ensure that much of the working-
class population are heavily reliant on the assistance provided by their communal leaders. As 
Bauman explains, ‘the political economy of sectarianism is one where a small politically 
connected elite appropriates the bulk of economic surplus and redistributes it through 
communal clientelism’.25 Thus, the ‘post-war neoliberal state retrenchment compels the 
economically underprivileged to seek sectarian patronage for a range of social services’.26 
 The sectarian system further imprints itself in a deeply personal way on all Lebanese 
citizens. Lebanon’s constitution enshrines a ‘covenant of mutual coexistence’ between the 
groups. In this, groups are proscribed from interfering in the internal affairs of their 
neighbouring sects. Under the terms of segmental autonomy, the constitution devolves legal 
authority to the religious leaders of the groups over a range of personal matters, including 
marriage, divorce and child custody rights. These personal status laws not only serve to mark 
all Lebanese as sectarian subjects rather than equal citizens; they reinforce inequalities 
between men and women across sects. Civil marriage – marriage between members of 
different sects – is prohibited as it threatens the delicate demographic boundaries that 
delineate sectarian groups imagined as reified and bounded communities.  
 
Sexuality and Gender 
Lebanon’s sectarian system is deeply intertwined with gender and sexuality. As noted above, 
in order to maintain communal boundaries between groups, the Lebanese legal system – 
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enshrined in Article 9 of the constitution – is characterised by legal pluralism, which in effect 
grants a high degree of autonomy to the 18 formally recognised sects over their internal 
matters, especially in religion and schooling. The sects follow 15 separate laws regulating the 
personal status of their members, and each sect receives state funding to operate its own 
religious courts to adjudicate cases related to marriage, divorce, custody of children, and 
inheritance.27  
These personal status laws that uphold the sectarian framework act to reproduce 
patriarchy and homophobia. In connection to gender, the personal status laws sustain 
inequalities between women and men; for example, all confessions allow girls to marry at a 
younger age than boys, women are prohibited to pass their nationality to their children, it is 
much more difficult for women to obtain a divorce compared to men, and marital rape and 
other forms of domestic violence have been sanctioned. The status laws, furthermore, 
entrench cleavages and disparities among women with women in some sects receiving better 
conditions than others. Sexuality is also regulated by the sectarian apparatus. Law 534 of the 
Penal Code, which is used to enforce the status laws, criminalises sex deemed as ‘unnatural’, 
is directed at the LGBTQI population, and it carries a minimum one-year jail sentence.28 
Expressions of non-conforming gender identity is further prosecuted under several other 
articles regulating public morality. 
The interweaving of the sectarian system with gender and sexuality illuminates how 
women and sexual minorities are positioned as boundary markers of ethnic and nationalist 
projects. While women’s roles in such movements are often exalted as biological producers 
of members of ethnic collectivities, sexuality – especially supposedly non-reproductive 
groups like lesbianism and homosexuality – is framed as damaging the health of the ethnie. 
For example, the control of women’s sexuality is seen as a security issue in Lebanon. Since 
the premise of civil peace is framed as one in which boundaries between groups are frozen, 
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the right of a woman to pass on her nationality to her children is denied because it is claimed 
that women will then be able to marry men from different communities and risk changing the 
demographic equilibrium of the Lebanese state, thus undermining the sectarian system.29  
In response to their unequal status, major LGBTQI movements have emerged to 
challenge discrimination, inequality and, in consequence, the operating logic of the state’s 
sectarian arrangements. Lebanon’s LGBTQI activism provides an important example of the 
constrained forms of change that movements stimulate despite the existence of major 
impediments. 
 
Helem and LGBTQI Activism 
LGBTQI activism in Lebanon emerged through Helem, the first above ground LGBTQI 
social movement in the Middle East and North Africa. Helem30 began in the late 1990s as an 
underground on-line movement called Club Free. In 2004, a small number of activists formed 
Helem as a publically open ‘rights-based organization that focuses on advocating and 
lobbying for the legal and social rights of people with alternative sexuality’.31  Helem 
campaigned to end the criminalisation of, stigmatisation and discrimination against LGBTQI 
individuals. Helem, as a leading activist explained, ‘brings together all of these activists 
under one roof from different confessional backgrounds, different economic backgrounds, 
educational backgrounds’.32 
As a rights-based movement Helem’s ability to generate policy reform is severely 
bounded. The state refuses to officially acknowledge the existence of LGBTQI organisations. 
In 2004 Helem – as all Lebanese civil society organisations are required to do – submitted a 
formal notification of its existence to the Ministry of the Interior, who as per custom then 
registers groups to allow them to set up a bank account to access funding from donors. 
Although the Ministry of the Interior never officially rejected the application, it labelled 
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Helem as ‘shameful’ and shelved the application. In addition, Lebanese sexual minorities 
confront ‘discrimination in employment and arbitrary dismissal, to limited access to housing, 
health, and social services, to political and financial extortion’.33 A report commissioned by 
Helem activists noted that the LGBTQI community are ‘periodically arrested, detained, and 
tortured by Lebanese security forces, while incidents of societal and family-based 
discrimination have not abated’.34  
 The Lebanese LGBTQI movement also fragmentised. In 2007, a number of women – 
known as ‘Helem Girls’  – left Helem to set up Meem, an underground collective of 
feminists. An ideological cleavage also emerged between activists who positioned Helem as a 
movement positioned within the political left that seeks to confront the sectarian apparatus 
and activists who wish to forge a more moderate rights-based NGO. The net effect of this is 
that LGBTQI activism is currently split into a number of different NGOs or movements. The 
various NGOs, including Helem, Mosaic, the Arab Foundation for Freedoms and Equality 
and Pride Lebanon, work on various advocacy projects funded by various human rights and 
international development organisations. The radical activists, alternatively, have formed 
underground networks that refuse to accept aid from external funders. Thus, rather than 
present Lebanese LGBTQI activism as speaking with a homogenous voice, in this paper I 
acknowledge the multiplicity of positionings and tactics advanced by activists. 
 
Global Frictions 
As the first public LGBTQI movement in the MENA region, Helem immediately confronted 
a fundamental issue before they could advance rights activism:  how to construct a unified 
movement. This strategy relies upon the theory that since rights cannot be granted without the 
existence of a priori community, it is necessary for activists to forge a collective public 
identity. The capacity to project a homogenous and fixed group identity is vital for rights-
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based movements as it enables them to foster internal solidarity, stimulate pride, forge 
networks, project external power, and more crucially, the ability to demand rights in the name 
of the group.35 Indeed, ‘ambiguous, fluid identities don’t fly in the political world or in courts 
of law’.36 . A Helem activist explained: ‘In order for there to be rights there has to be a 
community’.37 
 Researchers and activists note the lack of a cohesive LGBTQI community in 
Lebanon. Thus, LGBTQI individuals do not necessarily ‘express any particular group 
solidarity . . . based on a perceived common sexuality or one informed by a mutually 
embraced political cause’.38 An LGBTQI activist explained to me: ‘it is very difficult or me 
to conceive of a LGBTQI community in Lebanon much less a LGBTQI movement’.39 Many 
of the visible signs of a LGBTQI community are conspicuously absent in Lebanon; an 
activist note: ‘acceptance isn’t at the point where you create gay enclaves or you have a gay 
part of town. Something like that hasn’t materialised’.40  
 To be sure, this situation is largely a consequence of the criminalisation of 
homosexuality in Lebanon and the sense of public shame that is associated with non-
conforming sexuality. In response, a group of core activists seek to create collective 
consciousness and pride among sexual minorities. Towards this objective activists in 
Lebanon initially positioned the movement within the global LGBTQI movement. This is 
identified as a ‘globalizing . . . gay community and political identity struggling for 
equality’.41 Indicative of an emergent global subculture, the LGBTQI social movement is 
‘where members of particular groups have more in common across national and continental 
boundaries’ than with those from within their own countries. This movement has ‘helped 
create an international gay/lesbian identity … by no means confined to the western world’.42  
 Helem linked itself to the global LGBTQI movement in order to provide the LGBTQI 
population a sense of collective identity. In 2003, the group made its first public appearance 
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by unfurling the Rainbow International flag during a public protest against the coalition’s 
occupation of Iraq.  By emphasising a universal expression of LGBTQI communal identity, 
Helem secured resources – economic and diplomatic – offered by international human rights 
groups to campaign for the decriminalisation of homosexuality. For example, Helem was 
given an award for its human rights activism by the International Gay and Lesbian Human 
Rights Commission (IGLHRC). As part of this, Helem followed a strategy of visibility – a 
core strategy of LGBTQI rights groups in the Global North – including a campaign of public 
outing and pride for movement members, such as public events to mark the International Day 
Against Homophobia. In 2017, a number of activists attempted to organise Beirut’s first Pride 
celebration.  
 In a sectarian system that reserves rights for ethnoreligious groups, non-sectarian 
movements demanding rights recognition often need to ‘upscale’ their mobilisation 
strategies.43 Groups appeal to international and transnational actors to pressurise the Lebanese 
state to address human rights. Indeed, as Ayoub argues, the transnational networks of 
LGBTQI advocacy organisations can have a positive effect on policy diffusion to new 
states.44 More particularly, Lebanese LGBTQI groups engage with sympathetic embassies 
and diplomatic missions to use whatever leverage and power they may have to advance 
LGBTQI rights with key Lebanese state actors and policymakers. Helem has also been 
funded by the World Bank, the World Health Organization, and the United Nations. A Helem 
activist noted, ‘western donors are pushing policy, policy and engagement’45 with the 
government. 
 Helem’s role as an actor in the global LGBTQI movement thus necessitated the 
alignment of the movement’s identity with the rubric of a universal and homogenous 
homosexual subject. This provided Helem with an instrument to try and convert a rather 
loose and unconnected non-heterosexual body of individuals into a strong sense of groupness. 
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Such community activism can be developed by learning from the global LGBT movement, 
especially from the Global North. A Helem activist argued: 
 
In order for there to be rights there has to be a community … The good thing about those enclaves in 
the United States, in Europe, is that you can have a lot of gay people move into a neighbourhood. Some 
people open up a barber shop, some people open up a supermarket, some open whatever, and all of a 
sudden you have a community that satisfies the needs more or less. And it thrives and it grows.46 
 
Helem’s engagement with global activism thus provides two key mechanisms for the 
movement. First, it provides the movement with a sense of identity in order to help foster an 
expression of collective community and pride among members. This community 
consciousness building provides the basis for demanding rights. Second, it enabled the 
movement to upscale their activism by courting powerful international actors to wield their 
leverage against local Lebanese political elites. Yet, despite the vital support networks 
afforded to it, Helem’s activists quickly viewed the movement as an anomalous presence in 
the global LGBTQI movement.  
 First, a number of Helm’s activists believed there was a misalignment between 
Helem's local activism and the concept of the global LGBTQI movement. For a former 
executive director, the notion of a global LGBTQI movement is something of a misnomer 
given that it is dominated by activists in the Global North: ‘The international movement is 
not international … Maybe there is some power in the movement in Latin America, but other 
than that it's the Global North. Even in the Global North, economic questions are important to 
sexual minorities but they are downplayed by the demand for civil rights’.47 More acutely, the 
objectives of activists in the Global North – such as recognition for same-sex marriage and 
adoption rights – lack saliency with the issues that confront the LGBTQI population in 




you have a lot of activists coming from abroad and they have a lack of sensitivity to the specificities of 
Lebanon … we are not closing the doors  to international collaboration. We need funders who realise 
the specific situation in this region. They say ‘we have gay marriage so you should have gay marriage’.  
We do not even have civil marriage, so why are you talking about gay marriage to us?48 
 
Another Helem activist stated: ‘this concept of gay nationalism for us is misleading … We 
are not trying to import models and then implement them here, we are trying to create our 
own struggles We don't want to be part of this big global ghetto’.49  
 Second, Helem was critiqued for being ‘Gay Internationalist Missionaries’, a group 
seeking to impose essentially ‘Western’ notions of universal homosexual identity and 
homophobia into the Middle East. This critique was outlined by the academic Joseph Massad, 
who argued that Helem reproduced the discursive identity categories of 
homosexual/nonhomosexuality that defines the Western sexual subject. The universal 
homosexual identity, claimed Massad, could not be easily imported into Arab societies, since 
the binary of homosexuality/heterosexuality is a product of Western modernity and does not 
belong to precolonial Arab culture. Massad drew a distinction between Western 
homosexuality and Arab same-sex desires, with the former being ‘an identity that seeks social 
community and political rights, while the other is one of many forms of sexual intimacy that 
seeks corporeal pleasure’.50 
 Third, the abundance of foreign donors supporting LGBTQI movements in Lebanon 
has led, in part, led to the proliferation of professionalised civil society organisations each 
providing niche services for the LGBTQI community. A number of LGBTQI NGOs in 
Lebanon have forged a network in which activists meet once a month to ensure that they do 
not duplicate applications for funding. The net effect of the increase of LGBTQI project 
funders has expedited a situation in which LGBTQI groups are primarily directed towards 
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working on projects that have clearly defined goals and primarily include service provision. 
For example, one activist explained that ‘we have an emphasis in service provision and 
capacity building’.51 An activist from another group explained ‘we are working on issues to 
do with torture, child protections, human rights, HIV testing, mental health’. Another noted: 
‘we are trying to empower LGBTQI people from local regions, tackling LGBTQI health or 
tackling advocacy’.52 Other NGOs, for example, work on helping Syrian LGBTQI refugees. 
Beyond this, LGBTQI organisations have held LGBTQI film series in various European 
embassies, and activists have organised IDAHO/IDAHOT weeks, an annual celebration of 
sexual and gender diversities, which has, in part, been supported by international agencies. 
These dynamics appear to fit into what is called ‘NGOisation’, the process in which the 
radical and confrontational potential of civil society is exchanged for the service provision. 
Thus, rather than seek to create a movement that confronts the state, for many activists, 
LGBTQI activism risks reproducing the very logic of the clientelistic framework that 
undergirds the sectarian system. While no LGBTQI NGO is a client of any of the main 
sectarian parties, they receive resources from international human rights groups. A former 
executive director of Helem argued: 
 
Our movement is sectarian in the sense that it is part of the clientelistic system. The movement is 
sucked into the clientelistic system and it has an impact from funding and donors and they are a very 
big factor in what happens … The radical aspect of civil society has been shut down. I think that it has 
been co-opted by the system. It’s the Lebanese system, it’s not just the government, the administration, 
it’s not just the warlords and elites; it’s the actual nature of the state.53 
 
Fifth, the NGOisation of activism generated a split along gender lines. In 2007, a group of 
women activists within Helem, known as ‘Helem Girls,’ became frustrated with what they 
saw as a male dominated movement that made LGBTQI rights its strategic goal. An LGBTQI 
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activist explained that the split between gay men and lesbian women partially stems from the 
inability of men to comprehend the specific nature of oppression that lesbians confront: 
 
I don’t think that gay men understand that lesbians are women, and women already in the Middle East 
have to deal with a lot more. Second, lesbian women also feel that they don’t have enough voice, or 
that they don’t have enough representation and unfortunately it translates into a zero-sum game, where 
we can’t have a NGO that has everyone together, so let’s have a lesbian NGO. 54  
 
The frustration of women activists led to Helem Girls forming their own movement called 
‘Meem.’ Formed in 2008, Meem was set up to engage in feminist and queer politics, which 
refused to articulate fixed identity-based approaches to gender and sexuality. Meem described 
itself as a ‘social justice movement’ that mobilises to contest the existence of oppression 
against gay women and bisexuals by targeting political sectarianism.55 Although Meem is no 
longer active, in comparison to gay men, a Helem activist noted: 
 
a lot of queer women’s movements are a lot more active [than men] because as women they are much 
more discriminated against as women and as lesbians, because of the way that the system is, because of 
domestic violence, the right to give your children nationality, because of misogyny across the board.56 
 
Localised engagements 
The previous section outlined how internationalisation of the Lebanese LGBTQI movement 
generated various frictional dynamics for activists. In response, a number of activists seek to 
connect the movement connect more strongly with the local exigencies of Lebanon. Activists 
begin this project by conceptualising how Lebanon’s sectarian system reproduces itself in 
terms of regulating sexuality, promoting homophobia and patriarchy. For example, a feminist 
activist explained that the fundamental basis for creating a unified women’s movement in 
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Lebanon is to facilitate an understanding how the sectarian system subjugates women by 
dividing their interests along ethnoreligious lines: 
 
The sectarian system divides our cause and makes it impossible for us to co-operate together because if 
I want to work with Shia women, we don't have same demands, we don't ask for the same thing, and 
we don't ask it from the same institution. If I want to work for them I have to work with the religious 
courts, but because I am not a Shia they will laugh at us and say you are coming to democratise our 
culture. They split our cause and it is very hard to remind women that we all have the same cause. They 
are dividing our cause and it is so hard to mobilise.57 
 
More broadly, activists work to illuminate how the sectarian system purposely discourages 
non-sectarian movements from advancing political claims. As noted by a leading Helem 
activist: 
 
The sectarian system in Lebanon is designed in a way with which to make it incredibly hard for change 
to happen and that renders it intrinsically homophobic, racist and sectarian. The way that the system is 
entrenched has legitimised sectarianism in the minds of the Lebanese public as something legitimate, as 
matter of fact, that it exists, so it has unfortunately made a lot of mobilisation for a lot of causes very 
problematic simply because it’s a very easy card for a lot Lebanese decision maker to play with which 
to exonerate their own positions and with which to excuse their own mistakes, with which to rally 
support.58 
 
In this way, LGBTQI activists note the closed nature of the sectarian system, in which it is 
not possible for movements to pursue LGBTQI rights claims through official state 
institutions. A former executive director of Helem explained:  
 
The sectarian system has always been opposed to us. Even if you want to go inside the institutions as 
an LGBT movement, you can’t. You can’t run for elections to get to parliament or link up with one of 
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the militias or one of the parties. These parties are still very homophobic, on the question of sexuality. 
The formal process is closed to LGBT activism. 59 
 
A document by the Meem, a feminist collective, asked: 
 
[H]ow does one advocate for gay rights in Lebanon? Suppose the government did want to expand gay 
rights, how would they even do that? Any effort to reform laws and practices towards expansion of gay 
rights would have to negotiate independently with each religious community because … any major 
political development in Lebanon requires the support of all the various sects.60  
 
 Lebanon’s LGBTQI movement recognises the difficulties of pursuing rights within 
the formal institutions of the state. In the absence of formal political opportunity structures, 
LGBTQI activism is crafted to deal with the local environment. As such, this activism 
operates backstage to create informal relationships, understandings and procedures with 
various key actors. In the context of LGBTQI movements having an extremely limited access 
to the formal governance and policy institutions, some activists devise ways to manoeuvre 
around the system. For example, some groups have overcome the ban on LGBTQI 
organisations receiving official Ministry of the Interior notification. One group received the 
official permit by submitting an application that made no mention of sexuality and instead 
emphasised the organisation’s role in spreading democracy, supporting human rights, 
building social and economic infrastructure, and empowering society. A leading activist 
explained:  
 
We played on the way to get registered.  We play with the words on the application because we know if 
you mention ‘LGBT’ you will not get a permit. We can open up a bank account and everybody knows 




Helem’s activism seeks to make homophobic institutions and practices inoperative. This 
requires activists to work through back channels and informal institutions. Helem’s activism 
engages with figures that oversee and implement discriminatory and oppressive acts against 
the LGBTQI population. An activist stated: 
 
We empower people connected to the LGBT population, such as lawyers, doctors, psychologists, so 
that they know how to deal with the LGBT population.  In this way we build connections with the 
wider society to provide knowledge so that they can deal with the LGBT community in a professional 
manner.62 
 
This activism recognises that Lebanon’s informal institutions or practices provide the main 
arena of engagement and contestation. A leading Helem activist argued that the movement is 
required to confront: 
 
The reality that is here in Lebanon, the system here, and the way it works, the relationships and the 
mechanisms that make it operate … rather than a state based on administration and laws, it’s based on 
connections and craftiness.63 
 
An important example is Helem’s strategic approach to Law 534. Although the movement 
publically lists decriminalisation of homosexuality as a fundamental objective, an activist 
stated: ‘our main goal is to end 534; however this is not going to happen anytime soon. I 
can’t imagine in my lifetime the Lebanese parliament sitting and discussing whether they 
should keep or remove Law 534’.64 Instead of pursuing policy reform, Helem utilises tactics 
to render 534 largely inoperable at the point of prosecution. This activism aims for de facto 
rather than de jure decriminalisation. Towards this, LGBTQI activists have lobbied a number 
of Lebanon’s judges not to apply Law 534 in court due to the ambiguous legal basis of 
21 
 
‘nature’ that is used to prosecute the LGBTQI population.  Since 2007, four court rulings 
have declared that 534 cannot be used to convict LGBTQI individuals. 
 The essentially informal understandings and relationships that have led to the 
inoperability of 534 engender forms of change that are provisional, reversible and subject to 
new forms of oppression and backlash. Despite few judges applying 534 for sentencing, since 
2012 there has been an increase in numbers of individuals arrested by the Internal Security 
Forces (ISF) on the basis of 534 or public nuisance laws. In many cases, individuals  – 
especially members of the trans community – are arrested solely on their appearance or 
mannerisms without evidence of any sexual act. A former Helem executive director 
explained that the ‘moral police’ – the security forces – ‘still try to police sexuality in other 
ways; they arrest people under public nuisance laws’.65 
 Arrestees are often illegally detained, subject to torture and even sexual violence. 
Thus, ‘relying on the law is really futile because it’s not about law 534, most of the cases that 
get to the courthouse are finally thrown out’.66 Instead, as an activist explained: 
 
It’s about the ISF security officer suspecting that someone is gay and then arresting them based on that 
suspicion, and then going illegally through their phone and their personal belongings to find any sort of 
damning evidence. When they do, they of course arrest everyone else they can find using these 
mechanisms and then what you have is the systematic use of torture and adaptive torture whereby they 
learn what works and doesn’t work.67 
 
A notable technique used by the ISF is anal examinations supposedly to determine suspects’ 
sexual behaviour. On one occasion in 2012, a raid carried out by the ISF on a cinema in 
Beirut led to the arrests of 36 men, all of whom were detained by the Morals Protection 
Bureau and subject to anal probes by forensic doctors. Similar to its work with judges on 534, 
Helem’s activism to deactivate anal examinations involves securing largely informal 
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understandings and procedures from key agencies. In particular, lobbying within the 
Lebanese Doctor’s Syndicate led to its head to ban doctors from carrying out anal 
examinations on the basis that they are medically and scientifically useless in determining 
whether consensual anal sex has taken place, that they constitute a form of torture and that 
they violate article 30 of the Lebanese law on medical ethics, which prohibits doctors from 
engaging in harmful practices. A Helem activist described the contingent character of their 
activism: 
 
The only tangible policy change that we were able to create, which is temporary because it’s non-
binding, so it might change at any point, is getting the syndicate of doctors to ban rectal exams and to 
get the Ministry of Justice to issue a memo, not a ruling, to the prosecuting general and heads of police 
bureaus and police stations saying that you are not allowed to do this test anymore.68 
 
As part of this project of grounding the movement in the local environment, Helem strives to 
positively change the cultural values and norms of key policymakers, practitioners and the 
wider public in relation to the LGBTQI population. The criminalisation of non-normative 
sexuality in Lebanon is sustained by the framing of such acts as inherently unnatural. 
Lebanese sexual minorities are discursively constructed as deviant through language. In 
Lebanese Arabic, the traditional term for homosexuality is ‘shaz’, which translates into the 
pejorative expression of ‘pervert/faggot’. As a Helem activist explained, the usage of ‘shaz’ 
generates a particular ‘mindset of people using this word’, which stymies their potentiality to 
accept the legitimacy of LGBTQI rights. Thus, ‘if you were saying I am a “pervert” - how 
can I get someone to listen to me?’69 The use of the ‘shaz’ descriptor has even been deployed 
in the past by the mainstream media in reports on the LGBTQI population.  
 LGBTQI activists contest these discursive and textual practices through a number of 
tactics. Helem have been instrumental to introducing the word ‘mithli’, which broadly 
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translates into ‘different from me’, as an alternative to ‘shaz’. While ‘mithli’ has as yet not 
completely replaced the ‘shaz’ descriptor it is now beginning to permeate public discourse. 
LGBTQI activists have achieved this change, in part, by cultivating relationships with a 
younger generation of broadcasters and media stakeholders sympathetic to the claims of 
LGBTQI and feminist activism. An LGBTQI activist explained the importance of change in 
language 
 
The entire language has changed, even how we call homosexuals.  In Arabic we would use verbs and 
adjectives that were very violent but after article after article, protest after protest people are becoming 
aware of the violence of these terms. 70 
 
Activists also work to get key policymakers to revise and challenge cultural norms and values 
of key policymakers. For example, as noted earlier, Law 534, criminalises homosexuality on 
the basis that it is supposedly ‘unnatural’. A number of judges, however, have refused to 
apply 534 by arguing that conceptions of nature are essentially socio-cultural constructs, 
making it impossible to designate any behaviour categorically against human nature. In 
declaring the decision not to apply Law 534, a judge commented that what is understood as 
unnatural is closely connected to ‘the mood of a society and its traditions’, and that society 
can also accept new ‘norms of nature’. 
 
Active Resistance 
Rather than simply align themselves with the objectives of international funders, many 
members of Lebanon’s sexual minority movement tailor their activism to the local context of 
the state’s sectarian institutions. As we have explored in the previous section, this activism 
entails operating through the state’s informal institutions in order to deactivate processes that 
oppress the LGBTQI population. If this strategy is one of engagement with the state’s 
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informal sectarian institutions, a more radical and frictional generated by some activists is to 
challenge and dismantle the sectarian system. Thus many activists in the Lebanese LGBTQI 
movement link their campaign against homophobia with the wider fight to oppose the 
sectarian system 
 Naber and Zataari note that some activists view ‘Lebanon’s sectarian structure … as a 
key site of struggle not only because it is divisive … but also because it is patriarchal and 
requires compulsory heterosexuality’.71 This opposition to power-sharing is evident in the 
statements of movement activists. For one former Helem leader, a fundamental objective of 
the LGBTQI movement is ‘fighting to end confessionalism of the political system’.72 Meem 
identified one of its major goals as ‘resisting sectarianism,’ since ‘the biggest challenge to 
any form of social justice in Lebanon is the sectarian makeup of its society’.73  For a former 
Helem leader, homophobia is inextricably connected to the sectarian system. Since ‘the 
attitude of Lebanese society toward homosexuality is linked with a social order that forces 
people into confessional identities … where a secular and progressive alternative is 
presented, Lebanese society will not fail to accept or even embrace an organisation calling for 
the end of oppression based on sexual preference’.74 
 In identifying power-sharing as censoring non-heterosexuality, radical Lebanese 
activists oppose it. LGBTQI resistance, therefore, is articulated not through advancing ‘a one-
dimensional liberal framework of ‘gay rights,’’ but through rejecting a sectarian identity.75 
LGBTQI activists align themselves with radical non-sectarian movements that call for 
political ‘deconfessionalism’, the abolition of the sectarian system. These movements 
represent the not insubstantial minority of Lebanese that intentionally challenge the 
exclusivist narratives of ethnic identity embedded into the consociational system. Such 
movements, including secularists, socialist, anarchist and feminist movements, represent 
individuals that disidentify from ethnic categories. 
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 As part of this project of conceptualising the effects of sectarianism, LGBTQI 
activists build links and networks with many non-sectarian groups in Lebanon.  An LGBTQI 
activist explained the importance of understanding the intersectional dynamics of Lebanon’s 
sectarian system, in which questions of sexuality are linked with other social identities: 
 
if you want to look at the sectarian system, you have to look at from an intersectional perspective. You 
have to look at in terms of how it effects your social class, your economic class, your race, your ability, 
your sexuality and if you look at that you will see how the layers are created. 76 
 
Another activist noted how many activists from other non-sectarian movements - including 
those concerned with corruption, gender, human rights, and the protection of public spaces - 
have become connected to LGBTQI activism. An LGBTQI activist noted: 
 
We now have a much wider movement which acknowledges the connections between things in the 
sectarian system. A lot of the people involved in protests against corruption have now become 
interested also in the feminist and LGBT movements.  I think that they see these as all part of the same 
dynamic. The same people who are against rights for sexual minorities are the same people involved in 
sectarianism and corruption.77 
 
 Thus, Helem and other LGBTQI groups forge networks with a range of Lebanese 
non-sectarian movements, ranging from feminists, movements against corruption, racism, 
rights for migrant workers, labour movements, and movements protecting public spaces from 
privatising public space. For one activist, the LGBTQI movement has advanced an ‘anti-
sectarian, anti-racist, and anti-xenophobic position’.78 A female activist has similarly written 
of how the LGBTQI movement engaged in a ‘critique of systems of oppression, such as 
patriarchy, racism, sectarianism, heteronormativity, Zionism, classism, rather than using a 
legal framework for organizing’.79  
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 One particularly fruitful alliance was forged in recent years between the LGBTQI 
movement and ‘Beirut Madinati’ (‘Beirut My City’), a political party that emerged to contest 
Beirut’s 2016 municipal elections by advancing a deliberate non-sectarian political platform, 
which included support for LGBTQI rights. Although Beirut Madinati lost the election, it 
nevertheless gained more than a third of the overall vote and more than half of the vote in the 
middle-class districts of east Beirut.  In response to the threat posed by new and liberal non-
sectarian parties in east Beirut, one of the main sectarian parties, the Kataeb, subsequently 
became the first mainstream Lebanese party to endorse the decriminalisation of 
homosexuality.  
 A further way in which activists contest the sectarian system is by making sexual 
difference into a form of dissident public culture. The lesbian social movement Meem’s 
statement of purpose captures this ‘non-identitarian’ spirit: ‘We are the non-conforming 
sexual community of Lebanon: the lesbians, the bisexuals, the queer, the questioning women, 
the transgendered and transsexual men and women, the Muslims, the Christians, the Druze, 
the atheists and agnostics’.80 Such politics, as Seidman notes, is a ‘resistance to identity-based 
models of self and politics … in a nation in which kin and sect impose enveloping and 
inflexible identities on all individuals’. 81 
 This non-identitarian politics excludes, as one activist writes, pursuing a ‘legal 
change/LBT rights discourse.’ Meem instead adopted a strategy of relative or ‘ambiguous 
invisibility,’ which eschewed a policy of ‘coming out’ and protest politics and instead 
focused on the safety of members by providing a safe space for lesbians.82 Meem’s resistance 
to ‘patriarchy and sectarianism’ began by creating a nonsectarian movement deliberately 
designed to transcend ethnic cleavages. In one document Meem explained that the 
movement’s ‘very existence as a diverse … community – one of the rare few in Lebanon – is 
in itself a challenge to the sectarianism endemic in Lebanese society and politics’.83 Meem 
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utilised the post-identity term ‘queer’ to situate their politics and they fostered ‘alliances with 
local women’s and human rights movements, with leftist political parties and progressive 
thinkers.’84 
 One particular way in which activists advance non-identitarian resistance to the 
sectarian system is through the relationships of members. To freeze the balance of power 
between the main groups, Lebanon’s sectarian system forbids marriage between members of 
different religious sects unless one of the partners converts to the other’s religion. The 
existence of same-sex relationships that cross sectarian boundaries profoundly disturbs the 
ethnic mosaic in which individuals are assigned to monolithic and discrete communities. 
Naber and Zataari illuminate, in relation to Lebanon, that ‘nonconformist sexuality 
challenges sectarianism, and there are more same-sex couples that come together across 
sectarian divides than heterosexual couples’.85 Yet, while LGBTQI activists view the 
movement as a challenge to political sectarianism, they also recognise that, in some ways, it 
can reproduce sectarian divisions.  
A Helem activist noted: 
 
The way that confessional politics works here is amazing, because sometimes it seeps into the LGBT 
community itself, much less so than the rest of the country … you see a lot more bi-sectarian 
relationships among the community. However, you also notice that there are a lot of LGBT people with 
a heightened sense of confessional and religious belonging. They go to two churches, the gay bar and 
the actual church (interview September 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
Adequate protection of human rights is central to sustainable peace in postwar societies. The 
failure to ensure human rights for all individuals in such states undermines the promotion of 
political and economic participation and thus undercuts the three lynchpins of the liberal 
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peace: rule of law, democratisation and free-markets. Yet, in many postwar states, public 
institutions, including governance forms, are purposely designed to give guarantees of rights 
to the main ethnic groups, a structure which has the corollary of excluding and negatively 
affecting the rights of non-ethnic groups, including sexual minorities.  
 At the same time, the spread of LGBTQI rights has become a core part of the global 
human rights movement and state and international aid and development agencies make 
protections for sexual minorities a key part of their work. These global human rights agencies 
sponsor local LGBTQI activists and movements in their struggle to achieve rights in societies 
where sexual minorities experience discrimination and persecution. Yet, rather than a top-
down model of global rights diffusion spreading from the Global North to the Global South, 
global processes, as Tsing reminds us, can only be charged and enacted through practical 
encounters at the local level.86 ‘For human rights ideas to be effective’, notes Merry, ‘they 
need to be translated into local terms and situated within local contexts of power and 
meaning’.87  
 A number of scholars deploy the concept of ‘friction’ to capture the encounters 
between global and local actors and norms – between human rights policy or rhetoric and 
actual practice – which may not always generate predetermined, predictable and positive 
dynamics. Notions and practices concerning global human rights may be ill fitting and 
inappropriate for activists working on the ground and who confront an array of complex 
dynamics. In response, local activists can act to reproduce, hybridise, and contest global 
rights norms, especially when these norms do not resonate with the local environment that 
activists work within. In this article I have analysed how these frictional dynamics operate in 
the context of postwar societies, particularly in places where sectarian power-sharing systems 
guarantee the rights of the respective ethnic groups perceived to have been involved in the 
conflict. While such power-sharing systems have short-term benefits by incentivising 
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belligerent groups to abandon violence for guarantees of democratic representation, in the 
long-term they tend to institutionalise sectarian divisions and politics. More particularly, such 
sectarian institutions overlap and intersect with gender and sexuality to reproduce patriarchy 
and homophobia. These institutions are also often weak and dysfunctional meaning that there 
is little possibility of non-sectarian movements, such as the LGBTQI movement, gaining 
access to advance rights claims. In this constrained environment, the LGBTQI movement 
confronts a strategic dilemma – whether to ‘upscale’ activism by courting powerful 
international actors to use their leverage to promote LGBTQI rights in Lebanon or to 
‘downscale’ by constructing modes of activism that are specifically designed to deal with the 
local character of the sectarian system. Rather than satisfactorily resolve this dilemma, 
Lebanese LGBTQI activist divide and disagree on what strategies to peruse leaving a rather 
fragmented movement that has increasingly undergone a process of NGOisation. While 
international donors and development agencies are undoubtedly important partners in the 
promotion of LGBTQI rights in places where sexual minorities constitute vulnerable 
communities, these actors need to be more understanding of the local context in which 
LGBTQI activism takes place. This sensitivity requires greater awareness of how postwar 
sectarian institutions impact on sexual minorities and the way in which activists work through 
informal institutions to effect change, which is often contingent and easily reversible.  
 Disputes over gay and lesbian rights occupy a central place on both national and 
international agendas in recent years. There is, however, little research on LGBTQI rights in 
divided societies emerging from intrastate conflict. Further work is urgently required within 
the field of peacebuilding and transitional justice studies to the capture the multiple 
dimensional relationship connecting contemporary conflict, peace processes and sexuality. 
More specifically, such research could examine whether contemporary conflict is 
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characterised by particular forms of violence against sexual minorities and what protections 
and rights should be afforded to LGBTQI populations in postwar peace agreements. 
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